Government Ministerial Responsibility in the United Kingdom

Responsibility of the Ministers of UK

For the doctrine of government under the law to be observed, it is essential that government be both accountable to parliament and to the electorate, and that government be conducted in a manner sufficiently open, subject to the requirements of the national interest, to inspire public confidence Marshall and Moodie describe ministerial responsibility in the following words, Ministers are responsible for the general conduct of government, including the exercise of many powers legally vested in the Monarch; and ultimately, through parliament and parties, to the electorate'.

Ministers inform and explain, apologise, take remedial action, or resign in support of the convention of ministerial responsibility. This is not an area regulated by statute, rather practice has developed according to precedent and guidance. Most recently, that guidance has become formalised in the Ministerial Code, issued by the Prime Minister at the beginning of a new administration. The responsibility of individual ministers for their own conduct and that of their departments a vital aspect of accountable and democratic parliamentary government. Ministerial responsibility is often described as a constitutional convention, yet it is a convention difficult to define with certainty and which, to a large degree, depends on the circumstances of each individual case. There is a distinction between individual ministerial responsibility and the collective responsibility that each minister has to support the government of which he/she is a member.

Collective Responsibility of Government:

One of the most significant conventions of the constitution is the collective responsibility of all governmental ministers-irrespective of whether or not they hold a place in the Cabinet. The principal rationale of the doctrine lies in government accountability to Parliament and through Parliament to the electorate. Collective responsibility is also a political necessity- demonstrating unity and strength within government without which political responsibility would be undermined. Three principal rules are subsumed within the concept:

If a government is defeated in the House of Commons on an issue of confidence it is conventionally obliged to tender its resignation. Deliberations within the Cabinet are to be kept secret. The records of Cabinet meetings are governed by rules restricting publication under the Public Records Act 1958. Discussions area also protected from disclosure in litigation by public interest immunity and may be covered by the Official Secrets Acts 1911-1989. Once a decision has been reached in the Cabinet, no minister may express dissent from that decision. If a minister is unable to concur with the he must resign.

The convention of collective responsibility:

Content of the convention:

Geoffrey Marshall has identified three strands within the convention:

The confidence principle: 

A government can only remain in office for so long as it retains the confidence of the House of Commons, a confidence which can be assumed unless and until proven otherwise by a confidence vote.

The unanimity principle: 

Perhaps the most important practical aspect is that all members of the government speak and vote together in Parliament, save in situations where the Prime Minister and Cabinet themselves make an exception such as a free vote or an agreement to differ'.

The confidentiality principle:

This recognises that unanimity, as a universally applicable situation, is a constitutional fiction but one which must be maintained, and is said to allow frank ministerial discussion within Cabinet and Government. From these broad principles can be suggested a number of practical applications of the doctrine, with varying degrees of constitutional certainty within our political and governmental system.

A minister must not vote against government policy:

This is perhaps the most fundamental point of the doctrine as, ultimately, voting strength in the House of Commons is not only the measure of confidence in and strength of a government, but is the test of its very right to exist. A vote is a clear public expression of a minister's support for the government. An unauthorised, dissenting vote would be expected to lead to immediate dismissal if there were no voluntary resignation. In general, an unauthorised abstention should lead to the same consequences, as maintenance of the doctrine is said to require not just the absence of dissent but also the expression of positive support. A minister must not speak against government policy: this is similar to the previous category, although a speech or other form of expression may not always be as clear cut as a vote. Ministers can always find ways, if they wish, of outwardly expressing 'loyal support' while sending out contrary signals by code words or phrases. Again, there is a general implication of positive support, not simply the absence of dissent. Jennings asserts that 'a minister who is not prepared to defend a Cabinet decision must, therefore, resign. Further from the minister's point of view it means only that he must ... speak in defence of the Government if the Prime Minister insists'. All decisions are decisions of the whole government this does not mean that the identity of the relevant departmental minister is not disclosed. For example, a decision on social security will be obviously, in normal circumstances, the immediate responsibility of the Social Security Secretary.

Ministerial Code:

The internal process through which a decision has been made, or the level of Committee by which it was taken, should not be disclosed. Decisions reached by the Cabinet or Ministerial Committees are binding on all members of the Government.

They are, however, normally announced and explained as the decision of the Minister concerned. On occasions it may be desirable to emphasise the importance of a decision by stating specially that it is the decision of Her Majesty's Government. This however, is the exception rather than the rule. This aspect of confidentiality means, for example, that a Minister should not, without authorisation, attribute policies, proposals, arguments or votes to particular ministers or groups of ministers, especially if the motive of the 'leaking' minister is to distance himself or herself from that particular position or to attack or discredit other ministers or their arguments, 'Competitive' leaking by Ministers as in the Westland affair in 1986, or coded arguments. 'Competitive' leaking by Ministers as in the Westland affair in 1986, or coded ideological arguments as in the Thatcher Government of the 1980s.,are ways in which dissenting ministers or those involved in policy or other disputes can seek to fight their corner without explicitly breaching collective responsibility.

A former minister must not reveal Cabinet secrets:

This extended example of confidentiality clearly has less force than revelations when a minister is still in office. As the Crossman diaries episode in the mid-1970s demonstrated, the time factor is crucial to the enforcement of the doctrine. Ministers who resign can if they wish make a public statement in Parliament, and publish a resignation letter, explaining the reason for their action. Where resignation statements reveal major policy or personal differences in Cabinet they can have serious consequences for the standing of the Prime Minister and the Government. And in principle such a revelation of Cabinet discussions requires the Queen's consent through the Prime Minister, because of the Privy Counsellor's Oath.

Collective responsibility- some recent developments:

There has been a long running political and academic debate about whether Cabinet decision making has been in decline, particularly in the light of perceived increases in Prime Ministerial powers. This debate has intensified following the Hutton and Butler reports into the lead up to the war in Iraq, and led to speculation about what this might mean for the convention of collective responsibility. In Clare Short's resignation speech to the House of Commons on 12 May 2003 she gave a critical assessment of the current state of collective decision making.

The Ministerial Code:

The major official guidance on the scope and extent of collective ministerial responsibility is contained in the Ministerial Code: A Code of Conduct and Guidance on Procedures for Ministers. This code was originally known as 'Questions of Procedure for Ministers' ('QPM'), which was first made public in May 1992.The concept of collective responsibility runs through the text of the Ministerial Code. The first principle of ministerial conduct that is listed in Section 1 of the Code states that: (i) Ministers must uphold the principle of collective responsibility'; Para 3 defines Cabinet and ministerial committee business as, in part, 'questions which significantly engage the collective responsibility of the Government, because they raise major issues of policy or because they are of critical importance to the public'. It goes on to state that matters 'wholly within the responsibility of a single Minister and which do not significantly engage collective responsibility as defined above,' need not in general be brought to Cabinet or committee, and advises that 'a precise definition of such matters cannot be given; in borderline cases a Minister is advised to seek collective consideration'. Para 4 states the crucial point that Ministerial Committees 'support the principle of collective responsibility by ensuring that, even though an important question may never reach the Cabinet itself, the decision will be fully considered and the final judgment will be sufficiently authoritative to ensure that the Government as a whole can be properly expected to accept responsibility for it.

Free votes:

The two main ways in which the normal rules of collective responsibility as regards ministerial unanimity are suspended are the 'free vote' and the 'agreement to differ'. Although there may be occasions where the two concepts may appear to merge into each other, the basic difference appears to be that a free vote is one where there is no stated Government policy on the issue and therefore the question of dissent by some ministers does not arise, whereas an agreement to differ is a situation where the Government has adopted a policy but has allowed ministers to dissent publicly from that policy to some degree. Free votes are nowadays most commonly recognised in issues of conscience, for example social, moral or religious questions such as capital punishment, abortion or gay rights, or Private Members' Bills, or in certain votes on changes to parliamentary procedure. But free votes may also be used as a device to avoid a Parliamentary defeat, or any serious consequences of a defeat. A free vote, in particular circumstances, may be recognition of a significant split within Government or its Parliamentary party, an attempt to construct a large cross-party majority a desire to avoid having to devise and announce a Government policy on a difficult issue.

Agreements to differ:

Perhaps nothing demonstrates the conventional nature of the unwritten UK constitution better than the few examples of authorised waiver, for strictly limited periods, of the doctrine of collective responsibility. When questioned about this in 1977, the Prime Minister, James Callaghan, said, 'I certainly think that the doctrine should apply, except in cases where I announce that it does not'. This demonstrates that the terms, duration and enforcement of the arrangement are a matter, ultimately, for the Prime Minister. Some have argued, in effect, that as an agreement to differ is itself a collective Cabinet decision, such an apparent split between fellow ministers is not a breach of collective responsibility, but an exercise and product of it. For example, in the 1932 debate on the agreement to differ on tariff policy the Lord President, Stanley Baldwin, declared that we have collective responsibility for the departure from collective action'. In his evidence to the court in the case of the Crossman diaries, the then Cabinet Secretary, Sir John Hunt said: 'I would not regard the 1975 EEC referendum as breaching collective responsibility because this was a decision by the Cabinet as a whole to waive collective responsibility on one particular issue for a limited time. It was not a decision which any Minister took unilaterally.'

Access to a previous Government's papers:

As with the issue of ex-ministerial memoirs or diaries, access to the papers of a previous administration by former or current ministers raises similar questions of continuing confidentiality. The Ministerial Code contains the following guidance: Ministers relinquishing office without a change of Government should hand over to their successors those Cabinet documents required for current administration and should ensure that all others have been destroyed. Former Ministers may at any time, and subject to undertakings to observe the conventions governing Ministerial memoirs, have access in the Cabinet Office to copies of Cabinet or Ministerial Committee papers issued to them while in office. On a change of Government, the outgoing Prime Minister issues special instructions about the disposal of the Cabinet papers of the outgoing Administration.

Individual Ministerial Responsibility:

In constitutional theory a minister holds personal responsibility for his or her own conduct and for every action undertaken by his or her department and is accountable to Parliament- and hence the electorate-for the department. In practice this theory is hard to sustain, particularly given the size of government departments. The classic position on individual ministerial responsibility is demonstrated by the Crichel Down affair in 1954 wherein a minister resigned his office following serious errors within his department, notwithstanding that he had no personal involvement with the matter. Nowadays the position is much changed and it is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rules as to when the sanction of resignation will follow from errors within a department. Between 1954 and 1982, no minister resigned office as a result of accepting responsibility for the wrongdoings of his or her department; however, 1982 saw the resignation of the Foreign Secretary and two Foreign Office ministers over the Falklands War. More recent resignations have stemmed from disagreements within Cabinet or personal conduct unassociated with actions within a department. In recent years ministers have tended to separate individual responsibility for matters relating to policy, for which they will not, generally laying the blame on the chief executive of the service or department in question. Individual responsibility which focuses on the ultimate sanction of departure from ministerial office, either by resignation or dismissal.

The convention of individual ministerial responsibility:

The convention of ministerial responsibility antedates the modern party system. It developed at a time in the nineteenth-century when the role of the government was limited and a competent minister could be assumed to have personal control of a department. The growth of mass parties, and the welfare state have changed the nature of the convention, but it remains an important aspect of the UK political system and the uncodified constitution. There are a number of interconnected practical demonstrations of accountability that a minister can make which can give effect to the requirement of individual ministerial responsibility to Parliament and to the public, in addition to any professional sanction or 'punishment'. Note the comment of the Defence Select Committee in the Westland affair: 'A Minister does not discharge his accountability to Parliament merely by acknowledging a general responsibility warrant it, by resigning. and, if the circumstances.

Accountability involves accounting in detail for actions as a Minister.' This may result in support for the decisions or actions in question, perhaps even if contrary to the views of a departmental or independent inquiry into them. The four main options available to a Minister who has to give effect to the requirement of individual ministerial responsibility are as follows:

Inform and explain: 

The basic requirement of accountability is that ministers explain their actions and policies to Parliament, and inform Parliament of events or developments within their sphere of responsibility. Thus ministers make statements on all sorts of issues from transport accidents to proposed new policy initiatives, and make available detailed explanations through Parliamentary answers, consultation papers, white and green papers and so on.

Apologise:

 Ministers who admit an error, of whatever kind, either by them personally or on behalf of their officials, will usually be expected to apologise to Parliament, as part of a full explanation, whether or not a resignation or dismissal is involved. It is often said that the House of Commons is generous and forgiving to those Members and ministers who admit their mistakes and atone for them, especially where the mistakes are not regarded as sufficiently serious for resignation. In appropriate cases an opposition may only seek an apology rather than a resignation, or the House may accept an apology even when resignation has been demanded originally.

Take action:

 A minister who is responsible for an unsatisfactory state of affairs will be expected to take appropriate remedial steps to correct it and to ensure that it should not happen again. This applies whether or not any resignations or dismissals are involved, although in some cases the remedial action may be promised and carried out by a successor in cases where the responsible minister has left office.

Resign: 

This is the ultimate accountability action and sanction. It is also the most difficult to categorise and explain. While the other actions noted above are essentially,in constitutional terms, administrative, executive actions, of ministers carrying out their ministerial duties to account in a substantive way to Parliament, resignation cases -- including those where resignation was successfully resisted, at least for some time, and cases of 'sideways' or other reshuffle -- can develop into essentially political battles, often, but not always, of a partisan nature.

Should ministers resign simply because something went wrong' in their departmental area or 'on their watch'? Or need they resign only when something went wrong because of something they, or their officials, did wrong? For example, did Lord Carrington and his two junior ministers resign because argentina successfully took possession of the Falkland Islands in April 1982, or because Foreign Office policy failed to prevent it, or because Foreign Office policy failed to prevent it because it was flawed?

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